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ABSTRACT: This paper reviews the evidence about the effects of
urbanisation and cities on productivity and economic growth in
developing countries using a consistent theoretical framework.
Just like in developed economies, there is strong evidence that
cities in developing countries bolster productive efﬁciency. Re-
garding whether cities promote self-sustained growth, the evi-
dence is suggestive but ultimately inconclusive. These ﬁndings
imply that the traditional agenda of aiming to raise within-city
efﬁciency should be continued. Furthermore, reducing the obsta-
cles to the reallocation of factors and activities, and more gener-
ally promoting the movement of human capital and goods across
cities may have signiﬁcant positive dynamic effects as well static
ones.
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Urban policy interventions in developing countries often have two objectives. The ﬁrst
is to make cities "work better" by improving their provision of local public goods, from
sewage to public transport. The second is to limit urbanisation, the movement of people
from rural areas to already crowded cities. This dual agenda is driven by the idea that
the priority for policy should be to alleviate the grim life of urban dwellers in developing
countries and slow down the growth of cities to prevent more misery. While there is no
doubt about the abysmal conditions in the slums of Nairobi or Calcutta, is the gloomy
outlook of many governments in developing countries about their cities justiﬁed? More
precisely, we ask two related questions. First, do cities favour economic efﬁciency? Sec-
ond, do cities and urbanisation bolster self-sustained growth?
To answer these two questions, an integrated and consistent theoretical framework is
ﬁrst developed. We start from the idea that the entire urban system is an equilibrium out-
come(possiblyonewherepoliticsandotherinstitutionalfeaturesplayafundamentalrole)
and lay down a simple graphical device to describe the main feedbacks. The framework is
then expanded to focus on a number of speciﬁc features of cities in developing countries.
This highly tractable and ﬂexible framework is also used to interpret the existing evidence
about cities and urbanisation in developing countries.
To the ﬁrst question about whether cities foster (static) economic efﬁciency, the answer
from the literature is a resounding yes. Cities provide large efﬁciency beneﬁts and there
is no evidence that they systematically hurt particular groups. We show below that this
result provides support for the ﬁrst pillar of traditional urban policies (those that seek
to improve the functioning of cities). The importance of efﬁciency beneﬁts from cities
also suggests that restricting urbanisation entails losses. Our theoretical framework also
underscores key complementarities in urban policy and cautions us about a number of
pitfalls.
The second question about the dynamic beneﬁts generated by cities is more difﬁcult to
answer. The existing evidence suggests that cities can favour economic growth provided
the largest city in a country does not grow too large compared to the others. While this
evidence is not strong enough to provide the basis for radical new policy initiatives, it
raises further doubts about policies that take a negative stance on cities and discourage
labour mobility.
The priority for policy should be more to prevent or curb the worst imbalances in
urbanisation rather than slow it down or reverse it. Broadening the focus from within-
city efﬁciency to between-city efﬁciency even suggests that reducing the obstacles to the
reallocation of factors and activities across cities is a highly desirable policy objective.
In conclusion, there is nothing wrong with the ﬁrst traditional pillar of urban policy in
1developing countries, although it may not be for the reasons that are commonly alleged.
In addition, instead of restricting the inﬂux of people into the cities, the second pillar of
urban policies in developing countries should be to favour the mobility of resources across
cities and regions while avoiding their concentration in only one primate city.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Our graphical framework is presented in
section 2. This section also discusses the main policy issues in the framework. Section 3
reviews the empirical evidence about greater economic efﬁciency in cities. This section
also expands the framework to discuss urban features that are salient in developing
countries such as primate city favouritism and dual labour markets. Section 4 focuses
on the evidence about the effects of cities on the dynamic of growth and development.
Finally, section 5 provides further discussion of a number of policy issues and offers some
conclusions.
2. A simple graphical framework to think about urban development
Modelling cities
Economic theories concerned with cities have a common underlying structure.1 This
structure contains three elements: A spatial structure, a production structure, and some
assumptions about the mobility of goods and factors. These elements are necessary for
any model of cities to be well speciﬁed.
Spatial structure. Since cities are located somewhere, some description of geography is
obviously needed. It is often convenient to distinguish between the internal geography of
cities and their external geography. Internal geography is concerned with land, housing,
infrastructure, and internal transport. External geography is about the development of
new cities and how cities are located relative to each other and to the location of natural
resources.2
Production structure. It may be tempting to specify an aggregate production function
that directly relates primary factors to the ﬁnal output, as is customary in much of
economic analysis. This standard simpliﬁcation is often not adequate in our context
because cities are characterised by increasing returns to scale and how such increasing
1The material in this subsection is adapted from Combes, Duranton, and Overman (2005).
2Depending on the focus of the analysis, some aspects need to be explained in great detail while others
can be modelled in a very simple fashion. For instance, models that emphasise market access often propose
a detailed modelling of the external geography of cities. On the contrary, models that focus on housing
supply usually assume a very simple external geography but need to pay more attention to the internal
geography of cities and the micro issues related to the operation of land markets. Furthermore, both the
internal and external geography of cities are often taken as exogenous. This may be true in the short run,
but this need not be the case in the long run as distances within and between cities can be modiﬁed following
changes in policy or technology.
2returns are generated has potentially important policy implications. In particular, detailed
assumptions are needed about labour, the nature of products, the production function of
individual ﬁrms, the input-output structure that links ﬁrms, and how the latter compete.
Three main mechanisms can be used to justify the existence of local increasing returns
(Duranton and Puga, 2004). First, a larger market allows for a more efﬁcient sharing
of indivisible facilities (e.g., local infrastructure), risks, and the gains from variety and
specialisation. For instance, a larger city makes it easier to recoup the cost of some
infrastructure or, for specialised input providers, to pay a ﬁxed cost of entry. Second, a
larger market also allows for a better matching between employers and employees, buyers
and suppliers, partners in joint-projects, or entrepreneurs and ﬁnanciers. This can occur
through both a higher probability of ﬁnding a match and a better quality of matches when
they occur. Finally, a larger market can facilitate learning about new technologies, market
evolutions, or new forms of organisation. More frequent direct interactions between
economic agents in a city can thus favour the creation, diffusion, and accumulation of
knowledge.3
Hence, the ﬁrst general feature that emerges from the literature is that many different
mechanisms can generate local increasing returns. The second main feature highlighted
by the literature is that sources of local increasing returns are also sources of local inefﬁ-
ciencies.4 For instance, specialist inputproducers ina modelof input-outputlinkages may
not be remunerated for increasing the choice of inputs in a city. In a matching framework,
ﬁrms are not compensated for increasing the liquidity of their local labour market. With
local learning spill-overs, workers are not rewarded for the knowledge they diffuse. More
generally, private and social marginal returns do not in general coincide in a city. This
means that urban production is inefﬁcient, in the sense that it does not make the best
possible use of local resources.
These two features have important implications. The pervasiveness of market failures
hints at a strong role for policy. However, the appropriate corrective policies depend on
the exact mechanism at play. The corrective policies associated with urban knowledge
spill-overs are not the same as those correcting for imperfect matching on the labour
market. Given that many mechanisms generate similar outcomes, identifying the pre-
3This typology differs from the traditional Marshallian ‘trinity’ (Marshall, 1890), which talks of spill-
overs, input-output linkages, and labour pooling. In fact the two typologies complement each other.
Marshall’s is about ‘where’ those effects take place (market for labour, market for intermediates, and a
mostly absent market for ideas) whereas the one used here is about the type of mechanism at stake (sharing,
matching, learning). Arguably, these three mechanisms (and their associated market failures) can take place
in different markets. Good policies will require knowing about both the type of market failures at play and
where they take place.
4This is a deep property of any model of increasing returns with a non-degenerate market structure.
Without any external effect, increasing returns would lead to a natural monopoly, i.e. a ‘factory-town’. The
latter certainly exist but are far from being the norm in the urban landscape.
3cise sources of agglomeration and their associated market failures is extremely difﬁcult
(Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). In terms of policies, this suggests extreme caution when
trying to ‘foster agglomeration effects’. From a modelling perspective, the fact that a
variety of mechanisms can generate increasing returns is very good news because we
expect agglomeration effects to be a robust feature of cities. This also suggests that we
can assume the existence of local increasing returns without having to rely on a speciﬁc
mechanism.
Mobility of goods and factors. Assumptions about mobility, both within and between
cities, play a crucial role. These assumptions need to cover the geographical mobility
of goods, services, primary factors, ideas, and technologies. The extent to which material
inputs and outputs are tradable clearly varies across sectors. Among primary factors, land
is immobile, although its availability for different uses (e.g., housing versus production)
is endogenous. Capital is often taken as highly mobile, with (roughly) the same supply
price everywhere. As emphasised below, the (imperfect) mobility of labour, both geo-
graphically and sectorally, is a fundamental issue that warrants careful treatment. Finally,
the mobility of ideas and technologies determines how production varies across space.
The ‘3.5-curve’ framework of urban development
Wenowpresentasimplemodelofanurbansystem. Thismodel, inthespiritofHenderson
(1974), can be represented diagrammatically.
The wage curve. The ﬁrst key relationship is the city aggregate production function
relating total output in a city to the local inputs. If the three primitive factors of production
are land, labour and capital and if furthermore land is perfectly immobile while capital is
perfectly mobile, the focus of our attention needs to be on labour. Rather than considering
outputperworkerasfunctionofthesizeofthelocalworkforce, itistechnicallyequivalent,
but more fruitful in terms of interpretation, to focus our attention on an inverse-demand
for labour that relates the wage of workers to the size of the urban labour force. This curve
is represented in ﬁgure 1 (a) and referred to as the wage curve in what follows.
In ﬁgure 1 (a), the wage in a city is increasing in the size of the urban labour force,
reﬂecting the existence of local agglomeration externalities. The intensity of local in-
creasing returns is measured by the slope of the wage curve.5 Since the nature and
intensity of increasing returns is expected to differ across activities so will the exact
shape of the wage curve. This upward-sloping wage curve stands in sharp contrast with
‘neo-classical’ wage curves that slope downwards. Local increasing returns have received
5Whether the wage curve should be concave or convex depends on the speciﬁcs of the mechanism(s) that
underpins increasing returns. For instance, an ever better match between workers and ﬁrms may have some
bounded (i.e., concave) beneﬁts whereas the entry of ever more specialised input producers might lead to
‘snowballing’ (i.e., convex) gains. The exact shape of the productivity curve is ultimately an empirical issue.
4Figure 1. Baseline case
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5a considerable amount of theoretical attention. Modelling cities in this way is consistent
with a fundamental stylised fact. Most, if not all, measures of productivity per capita
increase with the size of the local population (see below for a discussion of the evidence
in developing countries). In turn, a higher productivity in larger cities can explain why a
disproportionate share of economic activity takes place in a small number of places rather
than spreading uniformly over space as would be predicted by a neo-classical model.
If anything, the level of the wage curve (for any level of employment) is even more
important than its slope. The concentration of employment fosters urban productive efﬁ-
ciency. However, this is not the only determinant of urban productive efﬁciency. The latter
also relies on a broad range of productive infrastructures from roads and international
airports to well-functioning rental markets for commercial property. This observation also
suggests that the level of the wage curve can differ across cities of similar size because of
differences in infrastructure and local institutions. Level differences for the wage curve
can also occur because of natural endowments and a set of other factors discussed below.
The cost of living curve. The second relationship relates the costs of living in a city to
its local employment size. The main components of the cost of living are the cost of
commuting, housing and other consumption goods. It seems reasonable to assume that
commuting costs increase with population because a larger population implies longer
commutes and more congested roads. Similarly, one expects increasing population to
drive up the cost of land and thus, of housing. Under some conditions to be clariﬁed
below, a larger city with a higher cost of land also implies higher retail costs and thus a
higher price for consumption goods.
In ﬁgure 1 (b), the cost of living in a city is increasing in the size of the urban labour
force, reﬂecting increasing urban crowding.6 For reasons that will become obvious, this
curve is drawn with a reversed Y-axis. The precise shape of the cost of living curve is
driven by the details of the speciﬁc mechanisms that underpin it and is ultimately an
empirical matter. However, that the cost of living should increase with population is
intuitively obvious. As discussed below, the empirical literature strongly supports this
notion.
Beyond its shape, the level of the cost of living curve is also of fundamental importance.
First, just like with the wage curve the cost of living curve is also riddled with market fail-
6An important technical issue needs to be mentioned. An increase in productivity, which raises local
wages, may be expected to have a positive effect on the demand for land and thus on its price. If commuting
is paid in units of time, higher wages also lead to a higher shadow cost of commuting. Hence an upward
shiftinthewagecurveimpliesadownwardshiftinthecostoflivingcurveontheﬁgure. Wecanignorethese
two issues by assuming that the cost of living is paid in monetary terms only and that housing consumption
per household is ﬁxed. It is important to note that more formal modelling either ignores these effects or
suggests they are second order and thus do not completely offset the direct effect of a shift to the wage
curve. Hence, to keep the exposition simple, we ignore these effects in what follows. It would be possible,
though cumbersome, to consider this type of link in a more formal model.
6ures. For instance, un-priced urban congestion implies an inefﬁciently high cost of living
for any level of population. Poorly deﬁned property rights can also prevent the efﬁcient
densiﬁcation of cities since investors may be reluctant to invest in property upgrading if
they face a risk of expropriation, etc. Second, a low cost of living in a city also relies on
a vast number of local public goods. In this respect, the provision of roads and public
transport to ease commuting is important. The provision of many other public goods of a
less capital intensive nature such as security or air cleanliness also matters. Like the wage
curve, the cost of living curve is also expected to differ across cities because the latter differ
in their shape, availability of land, etc.
The net wage curve. The difference between the wage curve and the cost of living curve
is represented in Figure 1 (c) by the net wage curve.7 On that ﬁgure, this difference is bell-
shaped. This corresponds to the case where agglomeration economies dominate crowding
costs for a small population, while the reverse occurs for a large population. For this to
be the case, the wage curve must be steeper than the cost of living curve before a certain
threshold and ﬂatter beyond. At this threshold, net wages reach their peak (point B in the
ﬁgure). This peak can be interpreted as identifying a ‘pseudo-optimal’ city size, which
maximises net wages in the city. The reason this is only a ‘pseudo-optimum’ (also called
a constrained optimum) rather than a true optimum is due to the existence of market
failures in production and in the cost of living. These market failures imply that, on the
ﬁgure, the wage and cost of living curves are not as high as they could be.
The labour supply curve. The second curve represented in ﬁgure 1 (c) is an inverse labour
supply curve. For any level of net wage, it indicates the amount of labour supplied in the
city. For simplicity, we assume that labour supply is a function of the total local popula-
tion and ignore labour force participation decisions.8 In that case, this curve essentially
captures the migration response to local wages. A ﬂat labour supply curve, as in the
ﬁgure, implies perfect mobility. In a fully urbanised country, labour mobility takes place
primarily across cities and the labour supply curve mainly reﬂects the conditions in other
cities. In a country not yet fully urbanised, labour mobility mostly implies rural-urban
migration and the labour supply curve mainly reﬂects the conditions of rural hinterlands.
We return to this important issue below. Note ﬁnally that city-speciﬁc effects, such as
amenities, shift this curve. More attractive cities face a labour supply curve that is below
that of less attractive ones. This is because workers accept a lower net wage and are
compensated by higher amenities.
Equilibrium. The equilibrium of the model in absence of any policy intervention can
now be derived. The intersection between the labour supply and net wage curves deter-
7This curve is only a difference between two other curves and thus cannot count as a independent
relationship. Hence, the ‘3.5 curve’ name for this framework.
8We nonetheless distinguish between formal and informal sectors below.
7mines the equilibrium. It corresponds to a situation where workers obtain the net wage
they require to come to and stay in the city, given the local population. The intersection
between these two curves may not be unique. In ﬁgure 1 (c), the two curves intersect
twice (at points A and C). The labour supply curve ﬁrst cuts the net wage curve from
above (at point A) and then from below (at point C). Point A is not a stable equilibrium. It
is easy to see that a small positive population shock raises the net wage. In turn, from the
supply curve, this higher net wage attracts more workers, which again raises net wages
and this process continues until the city reaches point C. By the same token, a negative
shock if the city is at point A leads population and wages to fall to zero. Turning to the
second intersection at point C, a similar argument veriﬁes that this equilibrium is stable.
From ﬁgure 1 (c), once we have established the equilibrium population, NC, we can trace
upwards to ﬁgures 1 (a) and 1 (b) to read off the equilibrium wage, wC, and cost of living,
HC, respectively.
Before turning to welfare and policy issues, note that, to the extent that agglomeration
effects take place within sectors, cities have a tendency to specialise. To see this, it is
useful to consider two hypothetical activities in a city. These two activities are entirely
unrelatedandeachhasitsownproductivitycurveandagiveninitiallevelofemployment.
Workers in both activities face the same cost of living since everyone is competing for the
same land. On the other hand, the two activities offer, in general, different wages. Then,
workers are expected to leave the activity with the lowest net wages and move to the
other. This movement ends up only when the city is specialised in a single activity.9 More
generally, it is inefﬁcient to have ‘disjoint’ activities in the same city since they bring no
beneﬁt to each other and crowd each other’s land market. We thus expect the economic
composition of cities to reﬂect this. Hence, should agglomeration effects take place mostly
within sectors, cities should be specialised. If instead, agglomeration effects take place at
a broad level of aggregation with strong linkages across sectors, more diversity should be
observed.10
Finally, it is important to note that the analysis of cities is inherently a ’general equilib-
rium’ problem, in which the researcher has to look beyond the direct effect of a change
and assess the induced changes that follow. Doing this is possible only if there is a clear
analytical framework within which the various effects interact.
9Should, for some unspeciﬁed reason, the two activities have the exact same returns, a small employment
shock, positive or negative, in any of the two activities again creates a small asymmetry between the two
activities and leads again to full specialisation.
10As made clear below, this is not an empirically empty statement able to rationalise anything. We can
measure the strength of agglomeration effects within vs. between industries independently. Estimating
strong agglomeration effects across sectors and, at the same time, observing very specialised cities would
clearly be problematic.
8Welfare in the 3.5-curve framework
To discuss policy, we proceed in stages. This subsection discusses the main welfare issues.
This discussion should be viewed more as way to reach a deeper understanding of our
framework than a practical policy guide. General policy issues are addressed in the next
subsection before turning to speciﬁc policy problems in a development context in section
3.
Uncompensated externalities in production. The ﬁrst source of inefﬁciencies stems from
the production structure itself. As argued above, the microeconomic foundations of the
increasing returns operating inside cities are all associated with market failures. First,
the indivisibilities at the heart of sharing mechanisms generate a number of inefﬁciencies.
Like all indivisibilities, they imply that only a limited number of players enter the market.
This results in imperfect competition and the (socially inefﬁcient) exploitation of market
power. If new entrants increase the diversity of, say, local inputs, they are unlikely to
reap the full beneﬁts of this increase in diversity. We also expect ﬁrms to make their
entry decision on the basis of the proﬁts they can make rather than the social surplus
they create. Under imperfect competition, this is again inefﬁcient. Second, with matching
mechanisms, a different set of market failures is at play. For instance, ﬁrms neglect the
positive effects of their vacancies on the job search of workers. Finally, there are also
many possible market failures associated with learning mechanisms. Under imperfect
intellectual property rights protection, ﬁrms are likely to invest too little in knowledge
generation. In absence of rewards for knowledge diffusion, too little of it takes place.
Firms in cities may also be reluctant to train their workers if they expect them to be
poached by competition in the future, etc. These are only several of the inefﬁciencies
that can occur when production takes place under increasing returns.
If these inefﬁciencies were suppressed, wages would increase in the city for any level
of employment. Starting from the wage curve in part (a) of ﬁgure 2 (i), solving for the
inefﬁciencies in production leads to the thick line in part (a) of ﬁgure 2 (ii).
Uncompensated externalities in cost of living. The second source of market failures is re-
lated to the cost of living curve. If the private marginal costs paid by residents were equal
to social marginal costs (i.e., the costs to the economy), there would be no inefﬁciency
in cost of living. With no congestion, a perfectly functioning land market, and redistri-
bution of the land surplus, this equality between private and social marginal costs holds
naturally. Empirically, we expect neither of these three assumptions to be satisﬁed: land
markets are subject to signiﬁcant frictions and are strongly regulated through planning
and zoning regulations, increases in land values are not taxed away, and, as cities get
more crowded, congestion becomes more important. About the latter, note that trafﬁc
congestion is a major form of congestion in cities, but by no means the only one. Most
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Figure 2b  (i) Initial situation (ii) Fixing market failures








( ) N H  
G  
( ) N w  
Wage Curve 
Cost of Living 
 Curve 
( ) ( ) N H N w −  
Labour Supply 
Curve 
) (a  
) (b  








( ) N H  
G  
( ) N w  
Wage Curve 
Cost of Living 
 Curve 
( ) ( ) N H N w −  
Labour Supply 
Curve 
) (a  
) (b  
) (c  
Figure 2d  (iii) Making labour perfectly mobile (iv) Solving for the city co-ordination failure
10local public goods, from parks to cultural events, and many amenities are also subject
to negative congestion externalities. Poorly deﬁned property rights over urban land also
constitutes a critical issue in many developing countries.
The main implication of congestion and frictions on the land market is that the cost
curve in the absence of corrective policy is distorted. With proper corrective policies,
it should be possible to reduce costs of living for any population level in the city. For
instance, a congestion tax would reduce the level of trafﬁc congestion in the city and can
increase total surplus. Starting from the cost of living curve in part (b) of ﬁgure 2 (i), ﬁxing
the inefﬁciencies in cost of living leads to the thick line in part (b) of ﬁgure 2 (ii).
A higher wage curve and a lower cost of living imply a higher net wage curve in part
(c) of ﬁgure 2 (ii). After curing the market failures in production and cost of living, the net
wage curve and the labour supply curve intersect at points D and F (rather than A and C
prior to the policy interventions). The net wage curve has its maximum at point E instead
of B. Just like A, point D indicates an unstable equilibrium. The only stable equilibrium is
in F. This new equilibrium offers a higher net wage than the one with no intervention
at point C. Population is also higher. This is because solving for the inefﬁciencies in
production and the cost of living makes the city more attractive. In turn, the labour supply
response implies that workers migrate to the city.
The extent to which a higher net wage curve leads to a higher population versus a
higher net wage depends on the slope of the labour supply curve. Perfect mobility (i.e., a
ﬂat supply curve) implies that all the gains from curbing the inefﬁciencies are translated
into a higher population and more crowding. In absence of mobility, a vertical labour
supply curve implies that the upward shift of the net wage curve leads only to higher net
wages. It is also important to note that after solving all the inefﬁciencies associated with
production and cost of living, the equilibrium in F does not coincide with the ﬁrst best at
point E.
Barriers to migration. The third source of inefﬁciencies is related to the labour supply
curve and thus the migration process. The labour supply curve is driven by two different
set of forces. First, it echoes the net wage in the rest of the economy. For many developing
countries, we expect the labour supply curve to be mostly a reﬂection of rural earnings. In
that case, a higher net wage in rural areas implies a higher labour supply curve. Second,
barriers to migration are also reﬂected in the labour supply curve. More costly mobility
implies a higher and steeper labour supply curve.
Eliminating obstacles to mobility in part (c) of ﬁgure 2 (iii) thus leads to a lower and
ﬂatter labour supply curve. As a result, the equilibrium shifts to point G. Interestingly,
this new equilibrium implies a larger population and a lower net wage than the previous
situation at point F. The net wage decreases because reducing barriers to mobility makes
it easier for newcomers to settle in the city. Since the city is already in the region where the
11marginal agglomeration gains are dominated by the marginal losses in urban crowding,
an inﬂux of newcomers lowers the welfare of existing residents.
This negative result underscores a fundamental policy issue. Urban economies are
second-best economies. Nothing guarantees that ﬁxing a market failure always brings
the city closer to optimality. We already solved for the market failures in the wage and
cost of living curves before removing barriers to migrations. Nonetheless, there is yet
another market failure which prevents cities from reaching their optimal size. Unless this
last market failure is also ﬁxed, reducing the barriers to mobility need not improve local
welfare.11
The city co-ordination failure. As made clear by part (c) of ﬁgure 2 (i), the equilibrium
with no policy intervention (point C) is not efﬁcient and is located to the right of the
pseudo-optimum (point B). Without any corrective policy, existing cities are too large with
respect to their pseudo-optimum. Put slightly differently, employment concentrates into
too few cities that are too big.
The reason behind this inefﬁciency is a co-ordination failure. Fixing the inefﬁciencies
embedded in the wage, cost of living, and labour supply curves changes nothing to the
city co-ordination failure. In part (c) of ﬁgure 2 (iii), the equilibrium size, point G, is
still inefﬁciently large compared to the ﬁrst-best in E. It is easy to understand why this
inefﬁcient situation can be sustained. No one wants to move alone and develop a new
city because it would mean forming a very small and thus very unproductive city. It is
worthwhile to move to a new city only if it is already large enough or if a big enough
group of workers and ﬁrms decide to co-ordinate their move. The creation of such a
new city would be desirable for everyone since existing cities would become smaller and
thus be able to offer higher net returns. The problem is of course that, in absence of
correctivepolicy(ormarketforcities), thereisnomechanismtoco-ordinatethemovement
of workers to new cities.
To solve this governance problem and to reach the ﬁrst-best in E, two solutions can be
envisioned. First, the city under consideration may directly restrict its population size
to reach point E. Doing so implies rejecting residents and sending them to places where
they are worse off. Depending on where these rejected residents go, this can increase
the cost of living in other cities or increase rural population and thus arguably lower
agricultural earnings. Hence, this ﬁrst solution is a partial equilibrium response to the
city co-ordination failure which generates negative general equilibrium effects.
The second alternative is to create new cities and co-ordinate the move of residents to
these new cities. This creation of new cities implies a reduction of population for previ-
ously oversized incumbent cities and thus an improvement in welfare for their remaining
11Even though local welfare may decrease, aggregate welfare increases. This point is made clear later.
12residents. Should new cities be ﬁlled by rural migrants, this would also imply a decrease
in rural population and thus arguably an increase in agricultural earnings. In turn, a
higher welfare outside the city implies a higher labour supply curve. In this case, the
general equilibrium effects are positive.12 New cities can then be created until the labour
supply curve hits the net wage curve at point E. At this stage the entire urban system is
fully efﬁcient.
Practical policy considerations
It is now time to take a more practical look at urban policies. A fundamental policy
question should ﬁrst be answered: Is it worth it for policy to bother about cities at all?
Cities are clearly riddled with market failures: production is inefﬁcient, congestion is rife,
and overcrowding is expected to be the rule. The above welfare analysis also makes clear
that full urban efﬁciency is extremely demanding to achieve. Hence, there is a strong
temptation to view the ‘urban problem’ in developing countries as an unmanageable
pathology and neglect cities. That would be wrong. Having numerous inefﬁciencies only
implies that cities are much less efﬁcient than they could be and that there are important
gainsfromwell-designedurbanpolicies. Furthermore, existingurbaninefﬁcienciesdonot
imply that cities are less efﬁcient than their rural alternatives. Actually, the very success
of cities in developing countries points to the opposite. However suboptimal they may
be, cities typically offer higher returns and better long-term opportunities. Neglecting
cities and restricting their access can only have negative consequences: a worsening of
urban inefﬁciencies and ‘overcrowded’ rural areas, which in turn implies low returns to
agriculture and an exacerbation of rural poverty.
Going into the details, two important points need to be made about the wage curve.
First, the wage curve reﬂects a considerable number of evolutions that are determined
well beyond the city under consideration. To take a simple example, many developing
countries have policies that distort agricultural prices relative to manufacturing prices.
Since cities in developing countries are specialised into manufacturing and services, any
increase in relative manufacturing prices is likely to translate into higher urban wages
and thus a higher wage curve. In turn, this should lead to larger cities. More generally,
technological evolutions and government policies are going to be reﬂected in the wage
12 More generally, general equilibrium effects (i.e., what happens outside the city) matter and play a
fundamental role. Changes taking place outside the city under consideration affect the labour supply curve
and thus its equilibrium. These interdependencies can mean that a worsening of the situation outside the
city (i.e., a lower labour supply curve) leads to an inﬂux of new residents and a worsening of the welfare in
the city as well. The importance of general equilibrium effects also implies that improving the functioning
of only one city makes it grow but has ambiguous implications regarding local welfare. A better functioning
city becomes attractive and the new residents can crowd out all the gains.
13curve. These changes are expected to affect the level of the wage curve and, sometimes,
its slope.13
The second issue with the wage curve is related to the market failures beneath it. To
repeat, the existence and growth of cities is driven by a variety of mechanisms whose
relative importance is extremely difﬁcult to identify empirically. The market failures asso-
ciated with these mechanisms then all require different corrective policies. For instance,
corrective policies aimed at dealing with labour market matching problems have nothing
to do with those aimed at fostering knowledge diffusion, etc. Put differently, we need
some corrective policies for inefﬁciencies which we know close to nothing about. This
suggests some caution.14
Given the limited possibilities for policy to raise the wage curve, the cost of living
curve is a more promising area of action for city governments. The main reason is that
many of the key determinants of the cost of living curve such as trafﬁc congestion are
reasonably well-identiﬁed problems which we know quite a bit about. From sewage to
public transport, there are many components of the cost of living curve for which local
governments can make a big difference. The second main policy issue related to the cost
of living curve has to do with poorly deﬁned property rights and the inefﬁcient operations
of the land market. This salient issue in many developing countries is dealt with at greater
length below. Finally, note that many other policies of local governments such as the
provision of public goods and amenities also get reﬂected into the cost of living curve.
Thisonlyreinforcesthepointthatthecostoflivingcurveisthetraditionalareaofexpertise
of city governments and should remain so.
Turning to labour mobility, it is clear that a ﬂatter labour supply curve can potentially
lead to important welfare gains by allowing workers to move from low net wage areas
13Regarding the latter, think for instance about progress in telecommunication technologies which may
affect the intensity of agglomeration effects.
14Furthermore, it is also the case that these market failures are likely to occur in all cities. Creating a more
efﬁcient labour market or favouring the diffusion of knowledge is more appropriate for central rather than
local governments. The main tool for local governments with respect to the wage curve should then be the
provision of productive local public goods. However, a complete discussion of this issue, including of the
qualiﬁcations that apply to the preceding statement, would take us well beyond the scope of this paper (see
Helsley, 2004; Epple and Nechyba, 2004, for recent reviews).
14to high net wage cities.15 As hinted above, this increase in mobility is best carried out
by central governments since any city that unilaterally increases labour mobility may de-
crease its local welfare. This prescription of greater labour mobility runs contrary to many
policies in developing countries that aim instead at restricting internal migrations. Given
the importance of labour mobility to improve efﬁciency in the short run, and possibly to
foster economic growth in the long run as well, this issue is further developed in the next
two sections.
The last prescription of the framework regards the fact that cities tend to be too large in
equilibrium calling for the creation of new cities and the co-ordination of their settlement.
This is of course a practical mineﬁeld and this recommendation should be taken with
extreme caution. Past experiences of city creation, and more particularly of capital city
creation, in developing countries have often led to mixed results (or worse). While in the
United States new cities are often created by private developers (Henderson and Mitra,
1996), few developing countries appear to be able (or willing) to follow suit. Besides,
developing countries already appear to host many very small cities. Hence, rather than
creating new cities, the challenge is the lack of growth of many small cities.16 These issues
are discussed at greater length below.
3. What’s special about cities in developing countries?
Empirical support for the framework
Before going deeper into policy issues, let us ﬁrst discuss our framework in light of the
empirical evidence in developing countries. In brief, the literature offers support for all its
main building blocks: an upward-sloping wage curve, costs of living rising with city size,
a bell-shaped net wage curve, and some labour mobility driven by net wage differentials.
15An important technical caveat applies here. In absence of pure externality in the wage and cost of living
curves, it is always good from an efﬁciency (and welfarist) perspective to have workers move from low
wage (rural) areas to high wage cities. This result holds even though cities are in a region of decreasing
returns. This occurs because the difference between the net wage curve and the labour supply curve exactly
measures the social marginal gain of one more migrant in the city. This is no longer true in the presence
of pure externalities. Then, a new worker into the city can raise the wage of all other workers (through
agglomeration effects) but also increase their cost of living. If the increase in cost of living associated with
the externality is very large, the private gains from the move for the migrant and the higher wages for all
workers can be more than offset by the cost of living loss of all the other inhabitants. Given how big spatial
disparities can be in developing countries (Aten and Heston, 2005), the congestion externalities would need
to be extremely large for migration from poor to rich areas not to raise overall output. This case remains to
be made empirically.
16One may object to this and argue that all cities, small and big, are already expected to be oversized.
There is no contradiction here if one acknowledges that cities should grow with their pseudo-optimal size.
Note further that the growth and industrialisation of small cities is all the more important since developing
countries often have their international comparative advantage in mature manufacturing sectors. Small and
mid-size cities are natural locations for such activities (Henderson, 1997).
15Starting with the wage curve, there is a large literature that documents the existence
of agglomeration effects in developed economies (see Rosenthal and Strange, 2004, for a
review). The main conclusion of this literature regards the existence of scale economies of
3 to 8% (i.e., the doubling of the size of an activity in a city raises its local productivity
by 3 to 8%). These agglomeration effects take place both within sectors (localisation
economies) and between (urbanisation economies). Although there is far less research
about agglomeration effects in developing countries, the results are usually similar.
As in developed countries, studies of agglomeration effects in developing countries
regress some productivity outcome in cities (and sectors) on city measures of economic
activity within or across sectors. See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and Combes, Duranton,
Gobillon, and Roux (2007) for more details about this type of methodology. Following
Henderson (1988)’s study of localisation economies in Brazil, several studies have found
quantitative evidence of localisation effects. For instance, Henderson, Lee, and Lee (2001)
ﬁnd localisation economies for Korean industries, more particularly traditional industries.
Lall, Shalizi, and Deichmann (2004b) for India, and Deichmann, Kaiser, Lall, and Shalizi
(2005) for Indonesia provide similar evidence, albeit less strong. Further evidence about
localisation effects can be found in a number of case-studies looking at a wide variety of
countries and sectors (see Overman and Venables, 2005, for references).
There is also evidence of urbanisation economies in developing countries. Henderson
et al. (2001) show that they matter for advanced sectors in Korea. There is also evidence
of urbanisation effects for India. It is rather weak in Lall et al. (2004b) but much stronger
in Lall, Koo, and Chakravorty (2003). Deichmann et al. (2005) also ﬁnd mild evidence of
urbanisationeffectsinIndonesiaforanumberofsectors. TheresultsofAuandHenderson
(2006a) and Au and Henderson (2006b) about Chinese cities are also consistent with a mix
of localisation and urbanisation effects. The evidence is further discussed in Henderson
(2005) and Overman and Venables (2005) who provide detailed reviews of agglomeration
ﬁndings for developing countries.
Strong localisation economies are expected to foster the growth specialised cities while
strong urbanisation economies foster that of diversiﬁed cities. Evidence of both localisa-
tion and urbanisation economies is consistent with the existence of diversiﬁed cities and
specialised cities in developing countries.17
Two main criticisms can be made to these studies. First, they usually do not control for
the individual characteristics of workers (observed and unobserved). It could be that mea-
sured agglomeration effects only reﬂect the sorting of more productive workers in bigger
and more specialised cities rather than true agglomeration economies. Using French data,
17Despite strong evidence about localisation economies, it seems that there are few specialised cities in
many developing countries relative to the US. Other factors such as high transport costs must thus be
invoked to explain these weak patterns of urban specialisation. See below for more on that.
16Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008a) show that such sorting is empirically important
and goes a long way towards accounting for observed spatial disparities. Nonetheless,
controlling for sorting does not make agglomeration effects vanish. Second, most of the
available ﬁndings concern primarily the formal sector. Hopefully household surveys that
cover both the formal and informal sectors will be used more widely in the future. At
this stage, we can only note that the linkages between formal and informal sector ﬁrms
are often intense which suggests that agglomeration effects are generated within both the
formal and informal sectors with beneﬁts that accrue to both. It is also worth mentioning
that the case-study evidence that supports the existence of agglomeration effects also
strongly supports the idea that the informal sector is a strong contributor.
Turning to the cost of living curve, the evidence is scarce. Early works by Thomas
(1980), Henderson (1988), and Richardson (1987) show a fast rise in the cost of living with
city size. These cost of living ﬁndings are conﬁrmed by more recent work from Henderson
(2002a) who looks at a broader cross-section of cities. He ﬁnds the elasticities of various
cost of living measures to cities size to be between 0.2 and 0.3. Finally, Timmins (2006)
develops a novel methodology to infer the ‘true cost of living’ from widely available data
using a model of location choice. He implements his approach on Brazilian data and ﬁnds
that the cost of living increases with city size above a certain threshold.18
The evidence about the net wage curve is extremely thin. The main difﬁculty here is
that, with sufﬁcient labour mobility, we expect all cities to be on the decreasing portion of
the net wage curve following the stability argument exposed above. Having most cities on
the decreasing portion of the net wage curve is, for instance, consistent with the Brazilian
ﬁndings of da Mata, Deichmann, Henderson, Lall, and Wang (2007). Direct evidence
about net returns to size being bell-shaped is provided by Au and Henderson (2006a)
and Au and Henderson (2006b) for cities in China. They exploit the fact that the Chinese
government has imposed very strong barriers to labour mobility. As a result, a very steep
labour supply curve is expected in China. Provided it is steep enough, some cities can be
too small in equilibrium and a bell-shaped net wage curve can be estimated. Interestingly,
Au and Henderson (2006a) and Au and Henderson (2006b) ﬁnd that Chinese cities tend to
be signiﬁcantly undersized. This results in large income losses. The other ﬁnding of Au
and Henderson (2006b) is that the net wage curve is quasi-ﬂat after its maximum. This
suggests that cities may become grossly oversized under free mobility but that the costs
of being oversized are small (unlike the costs of being under-populated).
Themigrationmechanismthatunderliesthelaboursupplycurvehasbeenwidelystud-
ied. Greenwood (1997) proposes a general survey of internal migrations in developed and
developing countries while Lall, Selod, and Shalizi’s (2006) review focuses on developing
18Interestingly, he also ﬁnds that the cost of living also decreases with population below the threshold.
This suggests that the cost of living is high in large cities and in small and isolated places.
17countries. A key ﬁnding of the literature is that internal migration ﬂows in developing
countries are consistent with an upward-sloping labour supply curve. Among many,
Brueckner (1990) and Ravallion and Wodon (1999) ﬁnd that the direction of migration
ﬂows is consistent with existing differences in net wages. In their work in Bangladesh,
Ravallion and Wodon (1999) also address the slope of the net wage curve by showing
that there are persistent differences in living standards across areas despite the absence of
formal barriers to mobility.
Closer to the spirit of the labour supply curve in our framework, da Mata et al. (2007)
estimate a population supply function for Brazilian cities and ﬁnd the elasticity of popu-
lation to income per capita to be between 2 and 3. This is quite elastic, but still far from
perfect mobility. Barrios, Bertinelli, and Strobl (2006) show that, in sub-Saharan Africa,
there is a direct link between climate, which directly affects living standards in rural areas,
and urban growth. This type of ﬁnding is consistent with an important role for shocks that
shift the labour supply curve, up or down. It also suggests that in less advanced countries,
the labour supply curve is mostly driven by living conditions in the countryside rather
than in other cities.19 This, in itself, is consistent with the traditional notion of surplus
labour (Lall et al., 2006). The ﬁnal conclusion that can be drawn from Barrios et al. (2006)
is more subtle. There is a negative correlation between urban growth and the welfare
of urban dwellers. This negative correlation may explain why many developing country
governments attempt to restrain urbanisation. However, this correlation is not causal.
Negative agricultural shocks lower the labour supply curve and workers ﬂock to the cities
thereby lowering urban welfare. Hence, cities can still offer efﬁciency beneﬁts despite
a negative correlation between urban growth and urban net wages. On the contrary,
preventing rural dwellers from moving to the cities can make them worse off.
We now turn to the development of new cities. Although the theoretical literature has
recently made progress on efﬁcient city development (Henderson and Venables, 2006), lit-
tle is known empirically about it. Using data about world cities spanning several decades,
Henderson and Wang (2007) use a 100,000 population threshold to track the entry of ‘new
cities’. Several interesting ﬁndings emerge. First, in a typical country, the rate of growth
in the number of cities is not statistically different from that of population growth. This
suggests that new cities do indeed rise and the rough proportionality between the entry
of new cities and population growth is reassuring. Nonetheless, this does not say much
about the efﬁciency of the process of city creation beyond ruling out the notion that it is
entirely dysfunctional. Henderson and Wang (2007) also show that the emergence of new
cities is favoured by democratisation and government decentralisation while it is slowed
down by having a large fraction of educated workers. With world urban population
19The corollary of this is that worsening rural conditions, which lower the labour supply curve, lead to
‘urbanisation without growth’, as documented for instance in Fay and Opal (1999).
18growing by about a hundred million per year, there is no doubt that those issues deserve
further attention.
Finally, there is scant evidence about cities being too large in general. Very strong
barriers to labour mobility have made Chinese cities too small according to Au and
Henderson (2006a,b). There is unfortunately no other study that attempts to look at this
question without making heroic assumptions about what optimal city size is. In light
of the framework exposed above and its predictions about cities being oversized, casual
observation of cities in developing countries raises some apparently puzzling facts with
respect to city size. While many mega-cities in developing countries such as Karachi in
Pakistan with a population well above 10 million are arguably ‘too big’, most cities in
developing countries are much smaller. In Thailand for instance, there is only one ‘large’
city with a population above 300,000. How is it that Bangkok could be too big with a
population nearing 6 million while the ﬁfth largest city in Thailand, Chiang Mai, could
also be too large with a population only around 150,000? To solve this puzzle, we can
extend our framework into two directions to consider the issue of primate city favouritism
and that of market access.
Primate city favouritism
Urban primacy is a well-known feature of urbanisation in developing countries (e.g.,
Henderson, 2005). The causes of why in so many developing countries the largest city
is often disproportionately larger than the second largest are still disputed. A careful
reading of the evidence nonetheless suggests two fairly simple answers. Urban primacy
is sometimes attributed to protectionist trade policies. In the model of Krugman and
Livas Elizondo (1996), trade liberalisation reduces urban primacy because it allows all
cities to import differentiated goods from abroad. In turn, this reduces the tendencies
for the agglomeration of manufacturing in a single core city. Although correct, their
model is arguably very particular. Rather than equalising market potential, it seems more
reasonable to assume that trade liberalisation gives privileged market access to coastal
cities or to cities close to trading partners. Then, inland primate cities can obviously see
their dominance reduced by trade liberalisation. Mexico City since NAFTA, which served
as motivating example to Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996), may be an illustration of
this. On the contrary, coastal primate cities can see their dominance reinforced by trade
liberalisation. Think of Buenos Aires in Argentina whose primacy remained unabated
despite trade liberalisation. The effects of trade policy are thus theoretically ambiguous.
More generally, the empirical support for trade-based explanations of urban primacy is
weak. Studies that ﬁnd a negative effect of trade on primacy often do so because they fail
to control properly for other channels that can inﬂuence primacy and are correlated with
19trade policy (e.g., Moomaw and Shatter, 1996). The better and more recent studies (Ades
and Glaeser, 1995; Nitsch, 2006) suggest that trade plays no systematic role with respect
to urban primacy.
Instead, political and institutional factors appear to be at the root of the primacy
phenomenon. There is strong evidence of a positive association between unstable and
undemocratic regimes and urban primacy (Ades and Glaeser, 1995; Davis and Hender-
son, 2003). The exact underlying mechanism(s) is nevertheless not fully elucidated. The
story is often told in terms of dictatorial regimes bribing the residents of the primate city
because they are afraid of being overthrown by social unrest. Direct evidence about this
mechanism is lacking. Furthermore, this type of explanation appears to assume fairly
strong state institutions able to tax their countryside and redistribute the proceeds to
the primate city. On the contrary, it may be argued that undemocratic and unstable
regimes are weak and favour primate cities ‘by default’. Primate city favouritism can
work through a myriad of small decisions from underpriced gasoline and better provi-
sion of local public goods to better business opportunities for government cronies in the
primate city (Henderson and Becker, 2000; Henderson, 2002b,a). In this respect, the many
regulations and permits that govern economic activity in most developing countries could
play an important role. Being close to a centre of power makes it easier to obtain permits
or to circumvent their necessity. A complementary explanation points at a better road
infrastructure linking the primate city to the rest of the country (Saiz, 2006). We can thus
speak of primate city favouritism, but keeping in mind that this favouritism takes place in
many different ways.
Primate city favouritism can readily be incorporated into our framework. We assume
for simplicity that favouritism (or the lack thereof) affects primarily wages. Earnings are
higher than they would otherwise be in the favoured cities. They are also lower than they
would otherwise be in the other cities since favouritism can only come at a direct cost for
them. Part (a) of ﬁgure 3 represents the wage curve for the favoured city and the lower
wage curve for a non-favoured city. As a result, with the cost of living curve being the
same in both cities on part (b) of the same ﬁgure, the net wage curve of the favoured city
is above that of the non-favoured city. It is then easy to see that the equilibrium size of the
favoured city is larger than that of the non-favoured city in part (c) of ﬁgure 3.20 Because
of general equilibrium effects, the labour supply curve is also lower than it would be in
absence of favouritism in part (c) of ﬁgure 3.
The potentially large misallocation of resources suggests that some effective policies
20On the graph, the favoured city is larger but not disproportionately larger than the non-favoured city.
This for clarity only. With a ﬂatter downward sloping portion of the net wage curve, this difference can be
made much bigger. According to Au and Henderson (2006b), the net wage curve is empirically rather ﬂat in
China.
20Figure 3. Primate cities favouritism
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21to reduce urban primacy are needed.21 However, dealing effectively with this problem
is going to be hard. First, primate city favouritism manifests itself in many different
ways and there is no deﬁnite evidence at this stage about which channel(s) matters
most. Interestingly, the Korean experience hints that administrative deregulation may
be a powerful tool to reduce urban primacy (Henderson et al., 2001). Red-tape may be
costly for all businesses but more so for those located far away from the main centre so
that deregulation is more beneﬁcial to them. Second, the political economy associated
with urban primacy may be very difﬁcult to break. Cronies who beneﬁt handsomely from
their proximity to the political power are unlikely to easily accept a levelling of the playing
ﬁeld.
Internal market access
The proposition that a good access to markets matters can be traced back at least to Harris
(1954). It was recently revived by Krugman (1991) and the ensuing work. This body
of work is referred to as the New Economic Geography and is summarised in Fujita,
Krugman, and Venables (1999), Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano, and Robert-Nicoud
(2004), and Combes, Mayer, and Thisse (2008b).
Krugman’s (1991) model considers two regions (rather than cities) and two sectors.
Agriculture produces a homogenous good under constant returns. For simplicity, this
good is assumed to be perfectly tradable and is produced by immobile workers. Manu-
facturing ﬁrms operate under increasing returns. Each monopolistically competitive ﬁrm
employs mobile manufacturing workers to produce a separate variety of differentiated
product, which is demanded by consumers in both regions. Manufacturing varieties are
costly to transport between regions so that ﬁrms’ sales have a ’home-market bias’.
The wage of manufacturing workers is determined as follow. Consider a ‘high’ level
of transport costs. This is a reasonable assumption for most developing countries.22 Due
to high transport costs, local manufacturing producers are partly insulated from imports
from the other region. Local producers can thus charge high prices, which in turn imply
high local manufacturing wages. If manufacturing expands, the local market gets more
crowded. This happens because, although the expansion of manufacturing also implies
a larger local market, the size of the latter does not increase proportionately (remember
the ﬁxed agricultural sector). Furthermore, with high transport costs, very little of the
21One may argue that such policies have been attempted for a long time. This is true but many of these
policies, such as the relocation government activities, did not provide the right incentives for residents to
relocate and took place in a framework of highly controlled labour mobility.
22Further details about this case and a complete explanation of the low transport cost case can be found
in Combes et al. (2005). Interestingly, the tradeoff between the two main forces described below is resolved
differently when transport costs are low.
22increase in manufacturing output gets exported. Basically, when transport costs are high
manufacturing wages decrease with the size of the local manufacturing workforce.
This alone would lead to a downward sloping wage curve and a dispersion of man-
ufacturing. However it seems difﬁcult to completely write off the urban agglomeration
effects described above. This suggests that the wage curve is determined by opposing
forces: market access vs. agglomeration economies.
Assume that market access effects dominate agglomeration effects in small markets
while the reverse holds in large markets. This implies a wage curve that ﬁrst slopes
downwards and then upwards. This wage curve is represented in ﬁgure 4 (a). We
concentrate on this case because it has more interesting implications than its opposite. To
defend it, one could also argue that negative market crowding effects can be very strong
at the margin in a very small market while they are going to be much milder if many ﬁrms
are already operating in a market. Furthermore, it could also be argued that a minimum
city size is needed for agglomerations economies to take place.
It is important to understand that transport costs affect not only the wage curve
(through the production of goods) but also the cost of living curve (through their con-
sumption). A small isolated city may face very low housing and commuting costs.
However, consumption goods can be very expensive because most of them are produced
elsewhere and need to be shipped to this city at a very high cost. As the city grows and
produces more manufacturing, the price of goods declines since a smaller proportion of
them need to be imported. On the other hand, other components of the cost of living
such as housing and commuting increase with city size. Again, we have forces pushing in
opposite directions. It seems reasonable to assume that higher housing and commuting
costseventuallydominatewhencitiesgrowverylarge. Thissuggeststhatthecostofliving
ﬁrst decreases and then increases as cities grow. The cost of living curve corresponding to
this situation is represented in ﬁgure 4 (b).
Subtracting the cost of living from the wage implies that the net wage ﬁrst decreases,
then increases, before decreasing again with city size.23 In ﬁgure 4 (c), the net wage curve
and the labour supply curve intersect three times. Ignoring the unstable equilibrium, we
are left with two stable equilibria. Cities are either very small, at point A, or much bigger,
at point C. The optimal city size (point B) is somewhere in between. Compared to ﬁgures
1 and 3, the novelty in ﬁgure 4 is the existence of small cities in A whose growth is limited
by strong local crowding on the product market and insufﬁcient agglomeration effects.
23This requires the wage curve to decrease faster initially than the cost of living as the city grows. We
expect this to happen because manufacturing wages are expected to decline proportionately to the price of
local manufacturing goods whereas the local cost of living is expected to decrease less than proportionately
since the prices of the agricultural good and imported manufacturing are unchanged while the other
components of costs of living increase.
23Figure 4. Internal market access
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24This crowding is in turn caused by high transport costs and the difﬁculty for the cities to
export their output.
The representation in ﬁgure 4 is important because it provides a strong rationale for the
co-existenceinmanydevelopingcountriesofsmallstagnantcitiesandlargeprimatecities.
Highcostsoftradebetweencitiesmayalsoexplainwhycitiesindevelopingcountriesmay
not be as fully specialised as in developed countries. This is because urban specialisation
makes little sense when the costs of inter-city trade are very high.
The literature offers strong empirical support regarding the importance of market ac-
cess for cities in developing countries. Using two different approaches, Lall et al. (2004b)
and Lall et al. (2003) underscore the importance of market access in India. Strong effects of
market access are also found in Brazil (Lall, Funderburg, and Yepes, 2004a; da Mata et al.,
2007) and Indonesia (Deichmann et al., 2005; Amiti and Cameron, 2007). This within-
country evidence is complemented by a large literature that looks at the importance of
market access at the country level (Redding and Venables, 2004; Head and Mayer, 2004).
Regarding the shape of the cost of living curve, the evidence is much thinner. In large
part, this is due to the general paucity of research on this issue. However, the paper
that currently deﬁnes the frontier on the topic (Timmins, 2006) ﬁnds strong evidence for
Brazilian cities of non-linear cost of living curves taking the shape hypothesised above.
Let us now turn to policy implications. Improving market access implies better access
to other markets but it is also synonymous with a loss of protection for local ﬁrms.
Depending on which effect dominates, the wage curve can shift upwards or downwards.
Better market access for small isolated cities also implies a less steeply decreasing wage
curve so that a ﬂatter wage curve (at least in its early part) is expected. With better
access, we also expect a lower cost of living. The cost of living curve could ﬂatten as
well. On balance, for small cities better market access implies a ﬂatter and possibly higher
net wage curve. In turn, this implies that the small city equilibrium at point A should
shift to the right (city growth) or even disappear entirely keeping point C as the only
stable equilibrium. With broad-based gains from better market access, we can also expect
a higher labour supply curve through general equilibrium effects. As a result of a higher
laboursupplycurve, theequilibriumsizeoflargecitieswoulddecrease. Theﬁnaloutcome
could be smaller big cities but a higher number of them.24
In practice, market access is improved by two sets of policies. The ﬁrst is about building
and developing roads and other transport infrastructure such as airports or high-speed
train lines. The second is about removing impediments to trade across regions, from
24Even assuming a reduction in urban primacy, sustaining much larger cities may only come from pop-
ulation growth, rural-urban migration, or the disappearance of some smaller cities. Hence having larger
cities may be synonymous with a smaller equilibrium number of viable cities. It may not be as much of a
problem as it is in Europe where population growth is minimal and the urbanisation process completed but
it is still worth a thought.
25administrative hurdles to cartelised distribution networks. A number of caveats must
be kept in mind. First, much remains to be done because most existing speciﬁcations
in the empirical literature are not derived directly from theory (Head and Mayer, 2004,
2006). Put differently, the importance of market access is established but it is still unclear
how it precisely works. Next, the development of road networks may have perverse
effects. Linking small cities to large economic centres increases the market potential of
the former but it may increase that of the latter even more and thus reinforce primacy
instead of reducing it.25 The US experience nonetheless suggests that there can be large
productivity gains associated with the development of an integrated transport network
(Fernald, 1999). Finally, improving market access may also have some effects at a ge-
ographical scale greater than cities. A key prediction of modern regional economics is
that lower levels of transport costs can lead ﬁrst to increased regional agglomeration, and
then possibly decreased regional agglomeration for even lower levels of transport costs
(Fujita et al., 1999; Combes et al., 2008b). However, with better transport infrastructure,
there is a possibility of a group of winning cities in core regions and a group of cities left
behind in the periphery.26 One could think of coastal Chinese cities vs. hinterland cities
or high-plateau cities in Colombia vs. cities on the Colombian Caribbean coast, etc.
In summary, urban primacy is often attributed to a dysfunctional political economy
leading to primate city favouritism. There is a lot of empirical support for this. A
complementary explanation points at high internal trade costs leading to either large or
small cities. A lot of the evidence is consistent with this explanation as well. In both
cases a reduction in urban primacy is desirable. Doing it through a reduction in primate
city favouritism may be effective but is hard to implement politically. Improving market
access for isolated cities may be politically easier to achieve but the precise effects of better
access are more difﬁcult to predict since improved access may reinforce primacy. Further-
more, as made clear below the exact policy prescription is likely to be country-speciﬁc.
For instance, increased political decentralisation may be effective to reduce primate city
favouritism in some countries but not in others.
Migration and dual labour markets
The framework developed above assigns a positive (and equalising) role to internal mi-
grations and labour mobility. This is in contrast with some of the academic literature and
much of the policy reality in developing countries. From internal passports in China and
the ‘nativist’ policies of Indian States to the resettlements policies carried on in Africa
25These theoretical ambiguities about the effects of transport costs on agglomeration are analysed in depth
by Baldwin et al. (2004).
26See Fujita and Mori (2005) for a systematic study of how transport costs can affect cities when regions
are explicitly considered.
26and Latin America, there is a strong bias against free labour mobility in many developing
countries.
As shown above, restricting the movement of labour is not the right answer if cities
become too big as in the framework exposed above. Another justiﬁcation for anti-mobility
policies rests on the existence of dual labour markets. The argument was ﬁrst developed
by Harris and Todaro (1970) and has been extremely inﬂuential in policy circles. Theoret-
ically, it works as follows. There is a formal sector with a ﬁxed number of urban jobs that
pay a high wage, wA, in ﬁgure 5 (a). In rural areas, workers get lower earnings represented
by the labour supply curve in ﬁgure 5 (c). This earnings gap between the rural and the
formal urban sector causes workers to move to the city.
Should there be only so many migrants to the city as there are jobs in the formal sector,
the city would end up at the social optimum, point A in ﬁgure 5 (c). However, when the
city is at point A it cannot be in equilibrium because the net wage is above that received
in rural areas. If there are more workers than available jobs in the formal sector, the model
assumes that jobs are randomly attributed to the city residents. The lucky ones get a job in
the formal sector while the unlucky ones get a job in the informal sector of the same city.
This informal sector offers a low wage, w. In this case workers keep moving to the city
until the expected wage they receive minus the cost of living (i.e., their expected net wage)
intersects with the labour supply curve.27 This occurs at point B. It is easy to see that this
equilibrium entails cities that are too large. The main difference with the baseline case
explored above is of course not that cities are too large – that was the case in the baseline
as well – but that it makes sense to curtail entry into the city.
Although appealing, the Harris-Todaro argument can be criticised on a variety of
grounds (see Lall et al., 2006, for an in-depth analysis and empirical references). It must
ﬁrst be said that workers end up in the informal sector because of wage rigidities in the
formal sector. Trying to solve a problem that occurs in the labour market by restricting
the mobility of workers is not the most direct solution and is likely to have a number of
unwanted side effects.28 The stark assumptions of the Harris-Todaro model also bias it
towards generating over-migration to the cities. For instance, workers are risk-neutral
and formal sector job are randomly allocated. However, workers are arguably risk-averse
and know that formal sector jobs are not randomly allocated so that only those with
high chances of getting one are expected to move. The fact that the formal and informal
sectors appear quite segmented in most developing countries only reinforces the point.
27The graph follows the approach of Brueckner and Zenou (1999) who explicitly consider a land market.
This already reduces the tendency of cities to become too big compared to the most basic versions of the
Harris Todaro model.
28This rigidity is also partly attributable to a very large and spatially concentrated public sector. The same
argument nonetheless applies. Restricting urbanisation is not the way to deal with a dysfunctional public
sector.
27Figure 5. Harris-Todaro migrations
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28Furthermore, the downward sloping wage and net wage curves predicted by ﬁgure 5 do
not receive any empirical support as made clear above. All this suggests that the main
argument used to restrict labour mobility is relatively weak.
To go beyond a mere rebuttal of Harris and Todaro (1970), we need ask ourselves why
restrictions on labour mobility are so widespread in developing countries. A ﬁrst possibil-
ity is to point at an overzealous application of Harris and Todaro (1970) by policy makers.
In such a case, policies can change after showing the weakness of their underpinnings.
Instead, restrictions on labour mobility may be part of a political-economy equilibrium.
In this latter case, better policies would then be much more difﬁcult to implement. We
need to know more about this issue to understand the nature of the challenge for labour
mobility and how it may be overcome.
Dual housing markets
The last key feature of cities in developing countries is the existence of a dual housing
sector with a division between the formal sector and squatter settlements (also referred
to as slums, invasions, shanty-towns, etc). In some large developing country cities, more
than half the population live in squatter settlements and face very poor public services
provision (if at all), insalubrious living conditions, and a number of constraints associated
with the precariousness of their housing.
Squatter settlements are often associated with the idea of low-cost and low-quality
housing. If it was only this, they would be simply a reﬂection of the general poverty
of some urban dwellers opting out of the formal housing sector because they cannot
afford it. Policy decisions regarding what to do with squatter settlements would mostly
be choices about how much redistribution to do (or not to do) and whether it is best to do
this redistribution through subsidised housing and public services or by other means.
These issues are important but there is more to squatter settlements than this. First, it
has been widely argued that poorly deﬁned or poorly enforced property rights over urban
land, which make squatter settlements possible, could also affect a wide range of other
economic outcomes. De Soto (2000) argues that a lack of effective, formal property titles
prevents residents of squatter settlements from using their housing as collateral and is
thusamajorbarriertoenterprisedevelopment. Althoughtheevidenceabouttheexistence
of these ﬁnancial constraints is disputed, Di Tella, Galliani, and Schargrodsky (2007) ﬁnd
that a lack of titles has important effects on the beliefs of people and thus their economic
behaviour and Field (2007) ﬁnds that it also matters for female labour supply.
Next, squatter settlements may be the outcome of policy distortions. Henderson
(2007) argues that binding minimum size lots is responsible for the growth of squatter
29settlements in Brazilian cities. One could also mention the prevalence of rent controls
(Malpezzi, 1999) that limit the expansion of the rental market, etc.
Finally, once the absence of public services or their very poor quality is taken into
account, squatter settlement may not be so cheap. For instance, water in slums often needs
to be bought at a very high price from local water distributors. Without titles, squatters
must also often pay a steep price for some form of protection, etc.
Taking the last two ideas seriously about exclusionary zoning by the formal sector and
the relatively high costs of squatter settlements, it is possible to expand our theoretical
framework to gain some insights about dual housing markets. In ﬁgure 6 (a), we assume
a standard upward-sloping wage curve that applies to all city residents.29 In ﬁgure 6 (b),
there are three cost of living curves. The dotted curve represents the cost of living in
the formal sector in absence of exclusionary zoning. Exclusionary zoning (e.g., minimum
lot size in Brazil) raises the cost of living in the formal sector, yielding the solid cost of
living curve of the graph. The alternative to the formal sector is a squatter settlement. The
cost of living in a squatter settlement is represented by the dashed line on ﬁgure 6 (b).
Because of the high cost of the substitutes for missing public services and other expenses,
the cost of living in squatter settlements is higher than in the formal sector in absence of
exclusionary zoning. The cost of living in squatter settlements is also higher than the cost
of living in the formal housing sector with exclusionary zoning for small cities but lower
for large cities. The main justiﬁcation for this is that the higher cost of ‘public’ services in
squatter settlements is rather insensitive to city size while the economy in land rent made
by squatting is more likely to increase with city size.
In absence of exclusionary zoning, the cost of living is always lower in the formal
sector and no one would choose to live in a squatter settlement. The net wage curve
corresponding to this situation is the dotted thin curve ﬁgure 6 (c). The city equilibrium is
reached at point C.
With exclusionary zoning, it is cheaper to live in the formal sector than in squatter
settlements when the city is small but it gets more expensive when the city grows. The
thick line in ﬁgure 6 (b) then represents the minimum cost of living under exclusionary
zoning. This thick line is solid (i.e., formal sector) for small cities and dashed for larger
cities since they expand though squatter settlements.
Under exclusionary zoning, the net wage curve is the maximum of the net wage offered
29In many cities with squatter settlements, a signiﬁcant proportion of slum dwellers have a job in the
formal (production) sector. Although the duality of the labour market is related to that of the housing
market, the two need to be distinguished. As a ﬁrst-order approximation, it is nonetheless reasonable to
assume that all workers beneﬁt from agglomeration effects. A more reﬁned version of the graph would
take into account the fact that slums are often located far from the main places of work and are poorly
served by public transport. Hence, slum dwellers are less likely to beneﬁt from agglomeration effects. We
acknowledge this but this is not core to the argument here which focuses on the housing market.
30Figure 6. Dual housing sector
 
C  
B H  
B w  
N  
Net Wage Curve 
(formal sector, no zoning) 
N
( ) N H  
B A
( ) N w  




( ) ( ) N H N w −  
Labour Supply Curve 
) (a  
) (b  
) (c  
Figure 6 
Wage Curve 
Cost of Living Curve 
(squatter settlement) 
Cost of Living  
Curve 
(formal sector,  
with zoning) 
Net Wage Curve 
(squatter settlement) 
Net Wage Curve 
(with zoning) 
‘Legal’ residents  Squatters 
31either by the formal housing sector or by squatter settlements. It is represented by the
thick ‘continuous and dashed’ curve in ﬁgure 6 (c). The equilibrium for the city is at point
B. Below the X-axis, we can read the city population that resides in the formal sector and
in squatter settlements.
This analysis suggests a number of policy implications. Imposing regulatory con-
straints in the formal housing sector may reduce the equilibrium size of the city but a
good fraction of this reduction is crowded out by the growth of squatter settlements. The
equilibrium for the city is at point B, and not at point A, as originally intended. Removing
unnecessary constraints in the formal housing sector is socially desirable since it lowers
the cost of living, hence raises the net wage curve and eliminates squatter settlements.
Furthermore, improving the situation in one city only is not enough to raise net wages
since a higher net wage curve may keep hitting the same labour supply curve, only at a
larger city population. Once more, general equilibrium effects matter.
‘Titling’ policies are also desirable because, as argued above, poorly deﬁned property
rights have a range of other negative side-effects. After solving disputes over land own-
ership and the ﬁnancing of the titles handed-out, the main issues with titling policies are,
ﬁrst, how to avoid further preemptive invasions driven by the expectation of a future title
and, second, how to make sure that there is a local tax counterpart to legalised titles. In
some respect, the problems in dealing with illegal settlements are the same as those of
urban favouritism. There are many dimensions associated with this phenomenon and it
is not clear yet which are those that matter most empirically. As with urban favouritism,
there is also a political economy of illegal settlements with vested interests that beneﬁt
from slums, either directly by charging their residents, or indirectly by providing expen-
sive substitutes for missing public services. These vested interests often pose formidable
challenges.
4. Does all this matter for growth?
Big effects of urbanisation on growth?
So far, the discussion has focused on the efﬁciency gains associated with cities. It could
be argued that such gains are mostly static in nature and that the urban policies discussed
above are, to a large extent, one-time improvements. This is true, although it should be
kept in mind that some of the improvements discussed above might be large and take
place over relatively long periods of time. For instance, Fernald (1999) estimates that the
US interstate system generated about one point of annual GDP growth during nearly 20
years.
32With this in mind, it is now worth asking whether cities and urbanisation can affect
the long-run rate of economic growth. This question is fraught with difﬁculties and the
empirical growth literature has not been particularly successful at isolating the causes of
long-run growth (see Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple, 2005, for a recent review). Sadly, this
literature has also barely paid any attention to cities and urbanisation as possible causes
of growth.
There is indeed only one study, Henderson (2003), that uses a reasonable cross-section
of countries and sound econometric methods to look at the dynamic aggregate effects of
cities and urbanisation.30 The two main conclusions of that study are the following. First,
urbanisation per se does not affect economic growth. Second, urban primacy has large
effects on economic growth. The ﬁrst conclusion is rather unsurprising and conﬁrms a
broad consensus. Urbanisation is a benign transition that, to a large extent, follows the
process of development but does not profoundly affect it. The second conclusion is more
provocative. Henderson (2003) ﬁnds that an increase in urban primacy by one standard
deviation (or 15%) from the mean (of 31% of the urban population living in the largest
city) reduces the rate of GDP growth by about 1.5% per year. These are large effects. They
are also interesting from a policy perspective since urban primacy can evolve relatively
quickly.
The question is of course how seriously we should take these estimates. The main
issue in any such investigation regards the direction of causality. A strong negative
statistical association between urban primacy and growth may not be surprising. A strong
causal effect is more so. To deal with causal issues, one ideally needs to ﬁnd some good
instruments for urban primacy, i.e., variables that determine urban primacy but are not
otherwise correlated with economic growth. In this case, one can use the variation in
urban primacy caused by these exogenous variables to assess the causal effect of primacy
on growth.
Unfortunately, it is hard to think of any variable that would determine primacy and
be otherwise uncorrelated with economic growth. In particular, the key determinants
of urban primacy, political variables, are expected to have a strong independent effect
on economic growth. Instead, Henderson (2003) proceeds as follows. He takes the ﬁrst
difference of all his variables to get rid of any permanent country effects that would be
correlated with both economic growth and urban primacy. Then, using a GMM estimation
technique, he instruments changes in urban primacy by lagged primacy levels from 10
or 15 years before. This estimation technique yields large effects of urban primacy on
economic growth.
30Using the same data, Bertinelli and Strobl (2003) replicate and conﬁrm some of the ﬁndings of Hender-
son (2003) using non-parametric techniques.
33How convincing is it? When it comes to urban primacy, past levels are good predictors
of current changes. Put differently, past levels are relevant instruments for contemporary
changes in primacy. That past levels of primacy are otherwise uncorrelated with changes
in the rate of growth is much harder to show. To make the case for the exogeneity of his
instruments, Henderson (2003) shows that over-identiﬁcation tests are easily passed. This
suggests that if the instruments used in the regression are invalid, it can only be because
they bias the results in the same way. It can also be argued that after ﬁrst-differencing,
one controls for all static explanations whereby institutions (a possible missing variable)
would explain both long-run growth and primacy. Unfortunately, this does not rule out
more dynamic explanations where institutions and urban primacy could interact at higher
frequency. Such a story nonetheless remains to be written and empirically assessed.
All this puts us in a very uncomfortable situation. On the one hand, Henderson’s (2003)
work uses the best available data and methods so that we should certainly not dismiss his
ﬁndings. On the other hand, his ﬁndings are not corroborated by other ﬁndings (for lack
of other work on this issue). To deal with this dilemma, the rest of this paper takes these
ﬁndings seriously but remains cautious in its policy recommendations and only advocates
policies that are not going to be harmful should the ﬁndings of Henderson (2003) turn out
to be spurious.
Explaining large dynamic effects of primacy
The simplest explanation behind potentially large dynamic effects of urban primacy on
growth relies on the idea developed above that primacy makes production less efﬁcient.
With less output, less is being saved. In turn, less accumulation can lead to sluggish
growth. This explanation is problematic for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that the level of output
does not seem to have a large effect on the rate of accumulation of capital and knowledge
(Caselli, 2005; Durlauf et al., 2005). The other problem is that any one-time change in static
efﬁciencyshouldalsohavelargegrowtheffects. Thereisnotmuchevidenceofsucheffects
in the empirical growth literature.
Another line of explanation is that the spatial system could be understood as the spatial
imprint of economic growth. As an economy develops, so does the way it is organised
spatially. Duranton and Puga (2001) argue that modern systems of cities experience a
division between cities where innovation takes place (‘nursery cities’ with a very diverse
production structure) and cities that are more specialised into the production of one
particularsetofgoods. Indevelopedeconomies, thelast50yearshavealsoseenagrowing
separation between business centres, which host headquarters and business services, and
production cities, which host production plants (Duranton and Puga, 2005). Finally,
Duranton (2007) shows that, within countries, sectors tend to change location quite fast
34following technological change. If the urban landscape is a reﬂection of economic growth,
the corollary may be that constraining the geography of cities hinders growth. More
generally, preventing urban dispersion by favouring the primate city or by preventing
the development of secondary cities is going to entail costs.31 For instance, favouring
a primate city can prevent the efﬁcient division between nursery cities and production
cities and thus slow down innovation. In the same vein, favouritism can also prevent the
development of new ideas and new productions in secondary centres. This type of claim
is of course hard to evaluate empirically. There is good evidence from Korea (Henderson,
2002b, 2005) that mature manufacturing quickly moved out of Seoul and relocated to
secondary cities. Brazil appears to follow a similar path, albeit more slowly (da Mata,
Deichmann, Henderson, Lall, and Wang, 2005). In many other countries, this process of
urban change appears to be even slower, if it takes place at all.
A number of policy implications are associated with this type of explanation. First,
heavy-handed policies to relocate economic activity away from primate cities are unlikely
to be successful because of the difﬁculty of replicating the subtle alchemy of nursery
cities. On the other hand, policies that reduce primate city favouritism are of course
desirable. Removing obstacles to the relocation of production plants in secondary cities is
also desirable. Finally, it should be added that production will move away from primate
cities only if it can access their markets back from wherever it chooses to relocate. This
suggests that transport and infrastructure policies are also important in this respect.
A third explanation is that cities may play a direct role in the accumulation process
and in innovation (and not only in production as emphasised by our framework). Back
to Jacobs (1969) and more recently Lucas (1988), there is a strong tradition in urban
economics that views cities as engines of growth (e.g., Eaton and Eckstein, 1997; Black
and Henderson, 1999; Glaeser, 1999; Rossi-Hansberg and Wright, 2007).
The model of Eaton and Eckstein (1997) assumes that individual human capital accu-
mulation is driven by three factors: the fraction of time spent learning, the current level of
humancapital, andthe‘knowledgebase’ofthecity. Inturn, theknowledgebaseofthecity
is taken to be the sum of the human capital in the city, possibly adding the discounted sum
of human capital of other cities. Because of these accumulation effects, larger and more
educated cities are desirable to foster growth. However, there are also costs to city size
with respect to innovation and factor accumulation. For instance, the physical crowding
of a city is time-consuming and thus implies that there is less available time to learn and
accumulate human capital. The opportunity cost of direct interactions in the city also
increases as it grows in size. In other words, there is an optimal city size that maximises
31This process of differentiation between nursery and headquarter cities (which need not be the same)
and production cities is strongly related to the older idea of a Kuznets curve for urban primacy, ﬁrst argued
by Williamson (1965).
35the rate of growth. This optimal dynamic size need not be the same as the static optimal
size. It can be bigger or smaller. Unfortunately, serious evidence on this issue is lacking.32
Beyond their immediate intuitive appeal, these models of urban growth are useful to
rationaliseanumberofimportantstylisedfactsfromtheconcentrationofhumancapitalin
large cities to the existence of spatial disparities in productivity. These models assign a key
role to local dynamic externalities, and in particular dynamic human capital externalities.
But do we know whether such externalities exist and, if yes, how much they matter
quantitatively? There is a large literature in developed countries about human capital
externalities in cities. Although not undisputed, the current consensus is that human
capital externalities in cities exist and might be large. Estimates of social returns to ed-
ucation being of the same magnitude as its private returns are not uncommon.33 It is also
noteworthy that dynamic externalities are taken seriously in macroeconomics to provide
a quantitative explanation to a number of puzzles about economic growth (Klenow and
Rodríguez-Clare, 2005). On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that externalities are
notoriously hard to identify empirically and the distinction between static and dynamic
externalities is still far from settled.
A key limitation of the urban growth literature is that it tends to view each city as
an ‘island of growth’. More precisely, it typically assumes that each city can generate
economic growth by itself and for itself.34 Although very little is known about this,
especially in a development context, it is fundamental to understand how knowledge
ﬂows across places within (developing) countries and between each country and the rest
of the world.35 Of course, this issue of knowledge ﬂows goes well beyond the scope of this
paper since it raises issues such as the protection of intellectual property rights and how
to set up the right incentives for the creation and diffusion of knowledge independently
of the spatial context.
To open the black-box of knowledge ﬂows within countries, a ﬁrst possibility is to
assume that knowledge is embedded in people and is acquired by direct contact with
‘those that know’. There are two facets to this issue. First, there is a compelling argument
that cities are places where workers learn. This was articulated ﬁrst by Glaeser (1999)
and later adapted to a development context by Lucas (2004). In particular, the latter
32See Bertinelli and Black (2004) for further discussion of these issues. The fact that many young profes-
sionals accept low net wages in New York or London might suggest that the dynamically optimal size of
cities is larger than the statically optimal size.
33This literature is surveyed in Moretti (2004). See also Duranton (2006) for a less technical introduction to
the topic. While most of the evidence is about Europe and North America, Conley, Flyer, and Tsiang (2003)
ﬁnd evidence of localised human capital externalities in Malaysia.
34It is true that Eaton and Eckstein (1997) consider the possibility of the knowledge base of one city to
depend on that of other cities. However, they model this in a ad-hoc manner by setting an exogenous
spillover function across cities.
35About knowledge ﬂows across countries, see Keller (2004).
36shows that rural workers may optimally migrate to cities and then spend some time
accumulating human capital before becoming more productive. This suggests that what is
interpreted negatively as urban unemployment of rural migrants in a Harris and Todaro
(1970) framework may actually be a time of adjustment and learning.
Existing empirical ﬁndings about learning in cities are very suggestive, though mostly
limited to the US. Glaeser and Maré (2001) show that there is an urban wage premium,
which workers retain when they move back to smaller cities or rural areas. Among a num-
ber of papers, Peri (2002) and Wheeler (2006) document that wage growth is stronger in
cities, particularly for young educated workers. This could be due to the self-selection of
workers with fast career progressions in cities for reasons unrelated to learning. However,
Freedman (2007) shows that this type of result is found even when controlling for the fact
that some workers may experience higher wage growth independently of their location.
Although this has not yet been investigated in a developing country context, there are
thus strong reasons to think that cities bolster workers’ learning. Restricting migration to
cities may then have negative dynamic consequences.
The counterpart to the learning-in-cities argument is that ﬂows of people are also
ﬂows of knowledge. Knowledge gets disseminated by people. This argument has been
modelled in the context of the mobility of employees between ﬁrms (Combes and Du-
ranton, 2006; Franco and Filson, 2006) but not yet between cities. Empirically, Møen
(2005) and Freedman (2007) show that technological progress is indeed associated with
the movement of skilled workers between ﬁrms. Job-hopping appears to be beneﬁciary
to the job-hoppers and to their industry, if not to their employers. In addition, Almeida
and Kogut (1999) show that long distance ﬂows of knowledge, as tracked though patent
citations in the US semiconductor industry, coincide with the movement of star scientists
across ﬁrms in different cities. Interestingly, Agrawal, Cockburn, and McHale (2006) also
show that the scientists who leave a city keep being cited there. They are gone but not
forgotten.
To the extent that these ﬁndings about highly skilled US workers also apply to highly
skilled workers in developing countries, we can draw a number of policy conclusions.
First, the general working of the labour market and more speciﬁcally the covenants that
restrict labour mobility can play an important role to hinder the diffusion of knowledge
within and between cities. A lack of labour mobility, especially in the most skilled
segments of the labour market, between the main city and secondary cities may be an
important contributor to both urban primacy and the backwardness of secondary cities.
With limited labour mobility between cities, nearly all skilled labour may go to the main
city and stay there. The main city then becomes an island of more advanced knowledge
with a much higher wage curve. As highly skilled workers remain in the primate city,
their knowledge does not percolate to other cities. These other cities then stay behind
37technologically and remain small because of their low wage curve. A key issue is that,
even in absence of formal impediments to labour mobility, this situation can remain since
the technological backwardness of small cities may provide little incentive for skilled
workers to relocate there.
If the two-way mobility of skilled labour between cities seems important to foster the
diffusion of technologies across places, it may not be the only channel. Although the
existing evidence mostly concerns countries and not regions within countries, there is a
good case to be made that more trade in goods is also associated with higher growth
and convergence across places. In a cross-country setting, Wacziarg and Welch (2003)
show that increased openness has large positive effects on growth and investment. Alcalá
and Ciccone (2004) also show that the positive growth effects of trade work through total
factor productivity. The effects found by Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) and much of the prior
literature in a cross-country setting are relatively large. For instance, moving from the
twentieth percentile of openness to the median raises productivity by 160% according
to Alcalá and Ciccone (2004). With no evidence of weaker effects when openness is
already high, this suggests that there are potentially large dynamic gains from removing
impediments to trade within developing countries.36
Finally, there is very strong evidence that productivity growth is linked to the process
of creation and destruction at the ﬁrm level (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996; Foster,
Haltiwanger, and Krizan, 2001; Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta, 2004). In partic-
ular resources need to ﬂow from less to more productive ﬁrms and allow new entrants
to rise and challenge incumbents. An analysis of this process of reallocation would, of
course, go much beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless it is important to remember
that in developed countries there is a strong spatial dimension to this process as industries
tend to change location when their technology evolves (Duranton, 2007). An important
conclusion here is that hindering the movement of factors across ﬁrms, including across
ﬁrms located in different cities, may have large dynamic costs.
5. Policy conclusions
It is now time to summarise our policy conclusions and consider a number of practical
issues regarding their implementation.
The ﬁrst issue is whether a growth agenda leads to urban policy recommendations that
differ from those of a traditional agenda, usually more concerned with urban efﬁciency.
The urban efﬁciency agenda is explored in the ﬁrst part of the paper. Its main recommen-
dations are the following: eliminate primate city favouritism; improve urban efﬁciency
36These gains could be all the bigger since after physical impediments to trade are removed, trade is much
easier to conduct within countries than between.
38so as to lower the cost of living curve by dealing with urban crowding, and public good
provision; solve the biases that lead to squatter settlements with a reasonable titling policy
and urban deregulation; improve market access between cities by developing transport
infrastructure and lowering impediments to trade; and do not discourage internal migra-
tions which foster an efﬁcient allocation of the population and have an equalising effect
across places.
By underscoring the need for better public service delivery and the importance of
housing and commuting issues, this set of recommendations is consistent with some of
the objectives of many existing urban policies. The main difference is that our baseline
framework also emphasises labour mobility. This emphasis is strongly at odds with
existing urban policies that often seek, on the contrary, to reduce labour mobility and
more generally to promote some form of stability. Another novelty of the static framework
explored above is to underscore the possible effects that technological, institutional, or
policy-driven changes can have on cities. The urban equilibrium is determined by the
interplay of the wage, cost of living, and labour supply curves. In turn, these curves are
determined by a wide array of forces, which can all affect cities indirectly.
Taking a more dynamic perspective does not fundamentally alter the recommendations
of more static approaches. It leads us to put even more emphasis on the mobility of people
and goods across places. This emphasis on mobility and ﬂexibility in factor allocation
and reallocation should also arguably be part of any modern growth agenda. Hence
even though, at some ﬁne level of detail, static and dynamic approaches to urban policy
might conﬂict (e.g., optimal city size may not be the same to maximise static vs. dynamic
efﬁciency), these divergences are minor from a practical perspective. It is also important
to note that an urban perspective on economic growth does not appear to conﬂict with
any broader growth agenda.
This being said, implementing a broad-ranging urban agenda aimed at bolstering eco-
nomicgrowthraisesanumberofproblems. Theﬁrstisthatsuchagendaisratherdemand-
ing since it includes raising the efﬁciency of public good provision, lowering barriers to
mobility, improving market access to allow secondary cities to develop, etc. The second
difﬁculty is the political economy of many of these issues is often a formidable obstacle
to change. Hence, politics and other more mundane feasibility constraints, such as the
limited capabilities of many governments, require establishing priorities. On the other
hand, the framework used above shows clearly that cities operate in second-best world
where ﬁxing one problem may not result in any tangible improvement locally. Hence
we face a policy dilemma where doing all at once may not be possible but a step-by-step
approach may not be effective.
Furthermore, growth agendas often identify a number of ‘growth drivers’ that need
to be fostered. Rather than drivers, it may be more fruitful in practice to think about
39constraints and bottlenecks to be removed. In this respect, the theoretical framework de-
veloped above can be useful to identify constraints to harmonious urban development.37
Since constraints and bottlenecks are likely to differ across countries, so will the diagnostic
and, ultimately, the urban strategy. The main caveat with this diagnostic approach is that
static constraints to urban development such as a grid-locked city are for all to see, while
dynamic constraints are much more difﬁcult to identify.
The ﬁnal question relates to who should be in charge of implementing any ‘cities and
growth’ agenda. The emphasis given here to the mobility of goods and factors between
cities suggests that central governments should have a prominent role in promoting
labour mobility, developing infrastructure, and removing impediments to internal trade.
However, cities have also an important part to play to improve the life of their residents
and minimise their cost of living. This division of labour between central and local gov-
ernments is nonetheless unlikely to remain free of tensions. First, there is a fundamental
asymmetry between primate cities and secondary cities. No secondary city can alone have
an effect on the entire urban system whereas primate cities do. There is also considerable
heterogeneity in the capabilities of secondary cities to design and implement local policies
that would be consistent with a national growth agenda.
37Although this would go beyond the scope of this paper, the framework used above and its extensions
could be further developed as a diagnostic tool in the spirit of Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2005).
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